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PERSPECTIVES
the case for intervention Bias in the Practice
of Medicine
Andrew J. Foy, MD,a* and Edward J. Filippone, MDb
aFellow in Cardiology, Penn State Hershey Medical Center, Hershey, Pennsylvania; 
bClinical Associate Professor of Medicine, Division of Nephrology, Department of 
Medicine, Thomas Jefferson University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Bias is an inclination to present or hold a partial perspective at the expense of possibly equal
or more valid alternatives. In this paper, we present a series of conditional arguments to
prove that intervention bias exists in the practice of medicine. We then explore its potential
causes, consequences, and criticisms. We use the term to describe the bias on the part of
physicians and the medical community to intervene, whether it is with drugs, diagnostic
tests, non-invasive procedures, or surgeries, when not intervening would be a reasonable
alternative. The recognition of intervention bias in medicine is critically important given
today’s emphasis on providing high-value care and reducing unnecessary and potentially
harmful interventions.
introduction
Bias is an inclination to present or hold
a partial perspective at the expense of pos-
sibly equal or more valid alternatives. In
this paper, we argue that intervention bias,
which has not been previously described,
exists in the practice of medicine. We use
the term to describe the bias on the part of
physicians and the medical community to
intervene, whether it is with drugs, diag-
nostic tests, non-invasive procedures, or
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surgeries, when not intervening would be a
reasonable alternative. We will present a se-
ries of conditional arguments to support the
existence of intervention bias in medicine.
We will then explore possibilities for why
intervention bias exists. Next, we will dis-
cuss its consequences. We will conclude the
paper by addressing criticisms of interven-
tion bias.
conditional arguMents
The first conditional argument is: If in-
tervention bias exists in medicine, then
physicians, when presented with the option
to intervene or not, more often choose inter-
vention when not intervening would be a
reasonable choice. Klingman et al. collabo-
rated with leaders of three medical societies,
the American College of Cardiology
(ACC†), the American College of Surgery
(ACS), and the American Congress of Ob-
stetrics and Gynecology (ACOG), to design
and conduct surveys of their members using
hypothetical clinical scenarios to find out
how they would act in each case and why
[1]. Their goal was to evaluate how often
physicians performed unnecessary tests and
procedures for defensive reasons. They
found that defensive medicine did exist in
their cohort, although not to the extent they
expected. Only 8 percent of interventions
were undertaken primarily due to malprac-
tice concerns. However, in all of the scenar-
ios, the majority of physicians chose
aggressive patient management styles even
though conservative management was con-
sidered medically acceptable. In most of
these cases, perceived medical indications,
not malpractice concerns, motivated clinical
choices. For example, nearly 60 percent of
cardiologists would get either an exercise
EKG or stress thallium study on a healthy,
active 42-year-old man with no risk factors
for coronary artery disease (CAD) who pre-
sented to the ER with non-cardiac chest pain
(i.e., pain with rotation of the left shoulder),
a normal EKG, and negative cardiac en-
zymes [1]. In another case, almost two-
thirds of cardiologists would hospitalize a
50-year-old woman who fainted in a hot
church but had no history of other serious
problems and was found to be orthostatic on
physical exam [1]. Eighty-three percent
would get a holter monitor, 83 percent an
echocardiogram, 40 percent a tilt table test,
and 40 percent a stress test [1]. In another
vignette-based study, Ayanian and Berwick
found that pediatricians displayed a propen-
sity toward action when faced with deci-
sions to recommend tympanostomy tube
placement or to order radiography in the am-
bulatory setting [2]. Their methods and re-
sults closely mirrored those of a classic
study conducted by the American Child
Health Association in 1934, which found
that school physicians were biased toward
intervention when it came to recommending
tonsillectomy [3]. This evidence shows that
physicians, when presented with the option
to intervene or not, more often choose inter-
vention when not intervening would be a
reasonable choice. Therefore, intervention
bias exists.
The second conditional argument is: If
intervention bias exists in medicine, then
physicians will adopt futile and potentially
harmful interventions based on scientific
theory alone, observational data, inappro-
priately designed trials and/or those using
only surrogate endpoints. Notorious cases
include treatment of anemia in patients with
chronic kidney disease (CKD) [4], vertebro-
plasty [5,6], anti-arrhythmic medications to
suppress ventricular ectopy post myocardial
infarction (MI) [6], routine stenting for sta-
ble coronary disease [7-11], rhythm control
for atrial fibrillation (AF) [12], screening
mammography [13] and PSA testing [14],
preoperative MRI for the management of
breast cancer [15,16], and goal-directed
blood pressure and diabetic management
[17-20]. For example, in CKD, strong epi-
demiologic evidence links anemia to a host
of adverse outcomes, including cardiovas-
cular events and mortality [21-23]. This led
to the widespread use of erythropoiesis stim-
ulating agents to treat anemia with little
more evidence than their ability to raise the
hemoglobin and reduce the need for trans-
fusions. However, subsequent randomized
controlled trials have shown that this very
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expensive therapy may indeed be harmful
compared to placebo and certainly so if at-
tempts are made to raise the hemoglobin to
near normal [4,24-26]. A similar case applies
to ventricular ectopy, which was found to be
a strong, independent predictor of total and
sudden cardiac death in the first 6 months
following acute MI [27]. This led to the
widespread use of anti-arrhythmic drugs to
suppress ventricular ectopy in post-MI pa-
tients without any evidence suggesting they
improved hard endpoints. Finally, the Car-
diac Antiarrhythmic Suppression Trial
(CAST) showed that these drugs conferred
greater mortality than placebo, and the prac-
tice was subsequently curtailed [7]. This ev-
idence shows that physicians often adopt
futile and potentially harmful interventions
without adequate evidence. Therefore, in-
tervention bias exists.
Medical reversal is the term used by
Prasad and Cifu to describe the process in
which a new clinical trial, superior to its
predecessors, contradicts current clinical
practice [28]. It does not mean that for every
indication and purpose the therapy in ques-
tion was shown not to work, but simply that
it was contradicted for key indications.
Prasad et al. examined a large collection of
high-impact literature and found that among
articles making a claim regarding a medical
practice, 13 percent were medical reversals
[29]. Ionidis has shown that 16 percent of
highly cited articles were contradicted by fu-
ture studies [30]. One could argue that med-
ical reversal does not prove the existence of
intervention bias and that using it to do so is
an unfair, post hoc indictment of the physi-
cian who, in good faith but without full
knowledge, has striven to attend to his pa-
tients. This ignores the fact that the first rule
of medicine is not “to do good” but emphat-
ically “to do no harm.” When viewed from
this perspective, jumping on the bandwagon
of new interventions “in good faith but with-
out full knowledge” is proof that interven-
tion bias exists. DiNubile argues that “in our
modern era of unprecedented scientific
growth,” contemporary physicians have be-
come more willing to accept the “latest and
greatest” without careful scrutiny and that as
a profession, physicians “seem more preoc-
cupied with sins of omission and less con-
cerned about errors of commission” [31].
The third conditional argument is: If in-
tervention bias exists in medicine, then inter-
ventions will persist on an individual and
systemic level after their benefit has been se-
riously challenged or disproven. Kadivar et
al. conducted a vignette-based survey and
found that a high percentage of physicians re-
port offering non-evidence-based breast (76.5
percent) and colorectal (39.3 percent) cancer
screening tests for young women [32]. In an-
other vignette-based survey of physicians of-
fering women’s primary care, Baldwin et al.
found that 28 percent believed that ovarian
cancer screening was effective, despite evi-
dence to the contrary, and that a substantial
portion reported routinely offering or order-
ing it [33]. Yabroff et al. conducted a cross-
sectional survey of primary care physicians
and found that their recommendations for
PAP test screening are not evidence based and
reflect an overuse of screening [34]. Trottier
and Taylor conducted a survey of critical care
physicians at a time when PAC use was being
questioned based on the results of new data
suggesting it was not helpful and could be
harmful. They found that 76 percent favored
a prospective, randomized, controlled trial in-
volving PAC, but at the same time, 95 per-
cent felt that a moratorium on further use was
not warranted [35]. The most important ex-
amples of medical reversal being disregarded
are recommendations for goal-directed blood
pressure and diabetic management. In these
instances, data from randomized trials indi-
cate that while treatment may be better than
no treatment in certain cases, targeting a spe-
cific level is not more beneficial and may in
fact be harmful [17-20]. However, based on
recommendations from professional guide-
lines, treatment to these targets is required to
meet quality of care standards [36,37]. This
evidence shows that interventions persist on
both an individual and systemic level after
their benefits have been seriously challenged
or disproven. Therefore, intervention bias ex-
ists.
The fourth conditional argument is: If
intervention bias exists in medicine, then
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physicians and medical scientists acting as
investigators, manuscript reviewers, and
journal editors will be more likely to submit
or accept manuscripts for publication that
have positive findings related to intervention
and to ignore or reject negative studies ―
this is formally known as publication bias
or positive-outcome bias. In one landmark
study, Emerson et al. randomly assigned 210
reviewers for orthopedic journals to receive
either a positive or negative test manuscript.
The manuscripts were identical in the “In-
troduction” and “Methods” sections but var-
ied in the “Results.” In one test manuscript,
postoperative antibiotics compared to no an-
tibiotics reduced the risk of a surgical-site
infection, and in the other manuscript, they
did not. Reviewers were significantly more
likely to recommend the test manuscript that
favored postoperative antibiotics [38]. The
reviewers also identified significantly more
errors in the manuscript with no difference
[38]. Turner et al. evaluated 74 FDA-regis-
tered studies of 12 antidepressant agents in-
volving 12,564 patients [39]. A total of 37
studies viewed by the FDA as having posi-
tive results (favoring the agent compared to
placebo) were published; one study viewed
as positive was not published. Studies
viewed by the FDA as having negative or
questionable results (not favoring the agent
compared to placebo) were, with three ex-
ceptions, either not published (22 studies) or
published in a way that, in the authors’ opin-
ion, conveyed a positive outcome (11 stud-
ies). This evidence shows that positive
findings related to intervention are more
likely to be submitted and accepted for pub-
lication. Therefore, publication bias exists
and, hence, so too does intervention bias.
It is possible that publication bias con-
tributes to intervention bias by giving physi-
cians the imprimatur of printed support for a
therapy. If this is true, then one could argue
that publication bias is not proof of inter-
vention bias but rather a cause of it. But this
begs the question, why is there publication
bias? It would seem logical that it exists be-
cause of physicians’ and the scientific com-
munities’ bias toward intervention. After all,
what makes a study positive is its rejection
of the null hypothesis in favor of an inter-
vention or in favor of a finding that repre-
sents a target for intervention. Therefore, it
makes the most sense that intervention bias
causes publication bias, which, in turn, fa-
cilitates more intervention.
causes
Why does intervention bias exist in
medicine? It is likely the manifestation of
two well-recognized forms of bias, self-in-
terest bias and confirmation bias. Theories
of political and economic science view self-
interest as the ultimate goal of many aspects
of human behavior. It also appears that self-
interest plays a strong role in attitude judg-
ment and persuasion. Through a series of
experiments, Darke and Chaiken showed
that self-interest biases attitude judgment in
a directional manner [40]. Because inter-
vention is often in the self-interest of physi-
cians and the health care industry from a
financial perspective, it could bias them to
more easily accept arguments in favor of in-
tervention and less inclined to accept those
who go against it. Prasad and Cifu cite that
“financial incentives are strongly aligned to
promote new technologies … conflicts of in-
terest among trialists, industry-sponsored
studies, and industry-sponsored economic
analyses all encourage wrongful optimism,
facilitating approval” [28]. Neuman et al.
found that 52 percent of panel members pro-
ducing clinical practice guidelines in the
United States and Canada on screening,
treatment, or both for hyperlipidemia or di-
abetes had financial conflicts of interest
[41]. But financial conflicts of interest are
not the only conflicts of interest that can in-
fluence recommendations from expert pan-
els. DiNubile was concerned that a lifetime
of work invested in a particular disease, test,
or discovery will naturally manifest itself as
overzealous recommendations from some
experts [31]. From this vantage point, prob-
lematic guidelines in favor of intervention
can be challenged as the exaggerated prod-
ucts of uncensored enthusiasm [20].
The act of intervention could serve
physicians’ self-interest in yet another way.
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According to Ayanian and Berwick, “clinical
satisfaction may be greater for doctors when
they recommend an intervention, giving a
sense of greater activism in their patients’
care” [2]. For many physicians, the ability
to intervene is tied directly to job satisfac-
tion and personal fulfillment. Those who
sub-specialize often do so based on their
affinity for the nature of the interventions in-
volved. Therefore, their ability to render
judgments about the appropriateness of in-
tervention would be affected by self-interest
bias. 
Confirmation bias is the tendency of
people to favor information that confirms
their beliefs or hypotheses. It is harmful to
objective evaluation, which is required as
part of the scientific method. One explana-
tion offered for medical reversal by Prasad
and Cifu was “[an] unjustified confidence
[hubris] in basic science models and surro-
gate outcomes” [28]. This could be ex-
plained by confirmation bias. Confirmation
bias may also explain why individual physi-
cians favor interventions based on anecdotal
evidence even after medical reversal. An ex-
perimenter’s confirmation bias could affect
which data are reported. Data that conflict
with the experimenter’s expectations may be
more readily discarded as unreliable, pro-
ducing the so-called “file drawer effect.”
The finding by Turner et al. that 60 percent
of negative trials registered with the FDA
were not reported confirms this [39]. Con-
firmation bias can also explain why data that
conflicts with reviewers’ expectations would
more likely be dismissed, as Emerson’s
study suggests [38]. 
Fear of malpractice is also a likely con-
tributor to intervention bias. Alpert refers to
defensive medicine and the need for tort re-
form as the “800-pound gorilla sitting
squarely in the middle of the U.S. healthcare
system” [42]. He goes on to state that “the
current medical liability environment in the
United States has resulted in the widespread
practice of defensive medicine, which in
turn has led to staggering volumes of un-
necessary diagnostic testing” [42]. Accord-
ing to Kowey, “defensive medicine is
pervasive and takes many forms. It extends
from ordering too many tests all the way to
performing unnecessary surgical proce-
dures” [43]. One mail survey of physicians
in six high-risk specialties in Pennsylvania
found that nearly all (93 percent) reported
practicing defensive medicine and “assur-
ance behavior” such as ordering tests and
performing diagnostic procedures was very
common (92 percent) [44]. A national sur-
vey administered by the AMA found that an
overwhelming majority of respondents (91
percent) reported believing that physicians
order more tests and procedures than needed
to protect themselves from malpractice suits
[45]. A survey of medical students’ and res-
idents’ experiences with defensive medicine
found that 92 percent and 96 percent, re-
spectively, reported encountering at least
one assurance practice [46]. These survey
results suggest that fear of malpractice may
be the overwhelming cause of intervention
bias; however, results from Klingman’s
landmark study strongly contradict this. As
reported under the first conditional argu-
ment, Klingman et al., working with three
medical societies (ACC, ACS, and ACOG),
designed and conducted surveys of their
members using hypothetical clinical scenar-
ios to find out how they would act in each
case and why [1]. They found that defensive
medicine does exist, although not to the ex-
tent suggested ― only 8 percent of inter-
ventions were undertaken for defensive
reasons. However, in all of the scenarios,
many physicians chose aggressive patient
management styles even though conserva-
tive management was considered medically
acceptable by the expert panels. In most of
these cases, perceived medical indications,
not malpractice concerns, motivated clinical
choices. Also, fear of malpractice would
play a minor role, if any, in influencing pro-
fessional guidelines that have been respon-
sible for codifying overtreatment in certain
cases like goal-directed blood pressure and
glucose management [33,34].
Moral hazard due to third-party pay-
ment for health care services also likely con-
tributes to intervention bias. Traditional
health insurance reimburses as a function of
expenditure or use. Because insurance
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drives the marginal price of medical care at
the point of use to near zero, consumers ―
or physicians acting as their agents ― de-
mand care until the marginal product of ad-
ditional care is nearly zero. Studies have
found that a fully insured population spends
about 40 percent to 50 percent more than a
population with a large deductible, and their
status is not measurably improved by the ad-
ditional services [47]. Oboler et al. found
that the majority of patients expect more
care then is prudent to deliver [48]. Sixty-
six percent of respondents believed that in
addition to regular care, an annual physical
examination is necessary. Many tests, in-
cluding Papanicolaou smear (75 percent),
mammography (71 percent), cholesterol
measurement (65 percent), prostate-specific
antigen test (65 percent), urinalysis (40 per-
cent), blood glucose measurement (41 per-
cent), fecal occult blood testing (39 percent),
and chest radiography (36 percent), were de-
sired. Interest in these tests decreased sub-
stantially when the charges were known.
The problem of moral hazard is likely
compounded by the use of patient satisfac-
tion surveys that are being widely used as
health care quality metrics. Fenton et al.
found that in a national survey of 51,946
adults conducted between 2000 and 2007,
higher patient satisfaction was associated
with greater inpatient use, higher overall
health care and prescription drug expendi-
tures, and increased mortality [49]. Studies
have shown that physicians often give in to
whatever patients want, whether it is med-
ically necessary or not. Wilson et al. found
that patients' perceived need for radiological
studies was significantly associated with use
of those services for outpatients with respi-
ratory problems and low back pain [50]. In
another study, 36 percent of physicians told
researchers they would yield to a patient
who asks for a clinically unwarranted mag-
netic resonance imaging exam [51].
Finally, waning clinical skills and lack
of confidence in clinical judgment promote
a bias toward intervention, especially the
overutilization of diagnostic testing. This sit-
uation has been lamented by several com-
mentators. Christopher Feddock, on behalf
of the Association of Professors of Medi-
cine, writes that “technology seems to be re-
placing basic medical skills rather than
complementing them” [52]. Herbert Fred
describes the period of 1975 to 2003 as the
“the laboratory-centered, high-tech years” of
medical training [53]. The high-tech diag-
nostic approach, according to Fred, shifted
focus from the patient to the laboratory and
gave rise to what he termed “technologic
tenesmus ― the uncontrollable urge to rely
on sophisticated medical gadgetry for diag-
nosis” [53]. As proof of concept, Penumetsa
et al. found that 68 percent of patients who
presented to an academic, tertiary care cen-
ter with chest pain and a very low pretest
probability of CAD (< 10 percent) under-
went stress testing after ruling out for my-
ocardial infarction [54]. Patients falling into
this category would be young with either
non-cardiac or atypical chest pain. Based on
Bayesian principles for clinical decision
making, stress testing is illogical in this pa-
tient group.
consequences
What are the consequences of interven-
tion bias? For one, informed decision mak-
ing relies on the validity of unbiased,
balanced, and objective data from published
studies, independent of the reported out-
come. This is corrupted by intervention bias,
rendering clinical recommendations flawed
toward specific intervention strategies. Next,
intervention bias can lead medical profes-
sionals to violate the principle of “primum
non nocere” or “do no harm.” This can occur
whenever interventions are undertaken with-
out rigorous experimentation and that per-
sist after medical reversal. Goal-directed
blood pressure management calls for certain
high risk groups to achieve a blood pressure
level of less than 130/80 mmHg. The most
definitive blood pressure targeting trial was
the Action to Control Cardiovascular Risks
in Diabetes (ACCORD) study [15]. At 4.7
years, there was no difference in the primary
end point of nonfatal myocardial infarction,
nonfatal stroke, or cardiovascular death, de-
spite achieving a significant difference in
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mean systolic blood pressure after the first
year (119.3 vs 133.5 mmHg). There was a
significant increase in serious adverse events
in the intensive-therapy group (3.3 percent
vs 1.3 percent, P < .001). Therefore, in re-
gard to intensive blood pressure manage-
ment based on results from the ACCORD
trial, the number of patients needed to treat
to provide a therapeutic benefit is theoreti-
cally infinite, but only 50 patients need to be
treated to harm one. 
Intervention bias also poses a serious fi-
nancial threat to the sustainability of health
care systems. Since 1970, U.S. health care
spending per capita has been more than dou-
ble the real growth in GDP per capita (4.3
percent vs 2.0 percent) [55]. Over that same
period, countries belonging to the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) averaged an annual growth
rate of 3.8 percent in health care spending
per capita compared to only a 2.1 percent
annual growth in GDP per capita. Eight of
20 countries had higher average annual
growth rates in health care spending per
capita than the United States [55]. A portion
of this growth is due to the adoption and
over-utilization of technologies that are ei-
ther futile or confer only minor clinical ben-
efits. Between 1987 and 2000, spending on
heart disease increased by greater than 26
billion dollars; 69 percent of which was at-
tributable to increased cost per treated case
[56]. During that time, the rate of stenting
increased 128 percent [57], despite repeated
negative trials involving the use of this
modality for its most often cited indication
[7-11]. 
criticisMs
One major criticism against the exis-
tence of intervention bias in medicine is, if
intervention bias exists then why is there un-
dertreatment of major conditions such as hy-
pertension (HTN) and asthma? There are
several explanations for undertreatment that
do not delegitimize the existence of inter-
vention bias. To some extent, undertreat-
ment, especially as it applies to goal-directed
management of chronic illnesses, is actually
a manifestation of intervention bias. Gu et al.
reported on trends in anti-hypertension use
and blood pressure control in the United
States from 2001 to 2010 using NHANES
data [58]. Control was identified as < 140/90
mmHg for the general population and <
130/80 mmHg for patients with diabetes or
chronic kidney disease. However, there is no
precedent from clinical trials that patients
benefit from these targets and they could be
harmful. Even the authors’ definition of hy-
pertension that justifies treatment, SBP ≥ 140
and DBP ≥ 90 mmHg, is not evidence based.
A Cochrane meta-analysis found that the
pharmacologic treatment of mild hyperten-
sion (SBP < 160 and DBP < 100 mmHg) in
patients without major co-morbidities did not
reduce the risk of death or non-fatal cardio-
vascular events compared to placebo [59].
Therefore, it could be said that many cases
of undertreatment actually represent evi-
dence-based medicine, and the definitions
used by Gu et al. and other investigators are
not valid determinants of undertreatment.
This issue repeatedly plagues studies look-
ing at compliance and appropriate use. Kerr
et al. conducted a retrospective cohort study
of diabetic patients within the VA system to
determine if appropriate action measures for
HTN were met [60]. They found that 94 per-
cent were appropriately treated despite the
limitations of goal-directed targets that have
been discussed. Interestingly, 8 percent of
patients had potential overtreatment, mean-
ing that antihypertensive medications were
added or intensified when BP was < 130/65
mmHg. Even if one were to grant the defini-
tion of undertreatment as valid, factors other
than physician treatment recommendations
would likely play a more important role such
as the limitations of data sources used to as-
sess compliance [61], patient insurance sta-
tus [58], and patient compliance with
physician recommendations.
conclusion
In conclusion, intervention bias is a
problem in modern medicine. It corrupts the
informed decision-making process and leads
physicians to adopt futile and potentially
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harmful interventions and continue using
them after their benefits have been dis-
proven. Futile interventions subject patients
to unnecessary physical harm and thus vio-
late the principle of “primum non nocere.”
From an economic perspective, the adoption
and widespread use of such interventions
confers a personal and social welfare loss.
Recognition is the first step toward over-
coming bias, and physicians must appreci-
ate the limitations that intervention bias
poses to the practice of medicine. To guard
against it, we should always remain skepti-
cal, insist on rigorous experimentation and
reporting of trials that involve hard end-
points, and be unafraid to protest the wide-
spread utilization of interventions that do not
pass this test. 
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